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Abstract How do population ageing shocks affect the long-run macroeconomic per-
formance of an economy? To answer this question we build a general equilibrium
overlapping generations model of a closed economy featuring endogenous factor
prices. Finitely-lived individuals are endowed with perfect foresight andmake optimal
choices over the life cycle. In addition to selecting age profiles for consumption and
the hours of time supplied to the labour market, they also choose their schooling level
and retirement age. Human capital is accumulated as a result of work experience, the
extent of which is determined by the intensity of labour supply. As the agent gets older,
biological deterioration sets in and human capital depreciates at an increasing rate.
This ultimately prompts the agent to withdraw from the labour market. The micro-
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economic and macroeconomic effects of three ageing shocks are studied, namely an
increase in the length of biological life (biological longevity boost), an increase in both
biological and productive life span (comprehensive longevity boost), and a decrease
in the net birth rate (baby bust). Robustness checks are performed by allowing for
capital market imperfections and indivisibility of labour supply.
Keywords Human capital · Education · Experience effects · Borrowing constraints ·
Indivisible labour · Retirement · Overlapping generations · Demography
JEL Classification E10 · D91 · O40 · F41 · J11
1 Introduction
By the time you are eighty years old you’ve learned everything. You only have
to remember it. George Burns (1896–1996)
Over the last half century most advanced economies have experienced substantial
demographic changes leading to an overall ageing of the population. Table 1 provides
some data for the nine economically most important OECD economies. For each
country the first row gives the crude birth rate expressed per one hundred members of
the total population. In the immediate post-war period these economies typically had
relatively high fertility rates with Canada even realizing a birth rate of almost 3 per
hunfred in the period 1950–1955. After the 1960s, however, a downward trend in the
crude birth rate is clearly visible in many of these countries. The most recent figures
show that the fertility rate ranges between 0.8 and 1.4.
In addition to this baby bust, these same countries have also experienced an increase
in life expectancy. For each country the second row gives the data for life expectancy
at birth. The increase in biological longevity is nothing short of spectacular. Whereas
in the 1950s life expectancy in all but one of the OECD countries was below 70years,
at the end of the sample period it ranges between 78 and 82.7years. So in the interval
of six decades advances in medical technology and increased hygiene have managed
to increase individuals’ length of life by roughly 10years.
The combination of a falling birth rate and increased longevity has led to an ageing
of the population. The third row for each country provides a simple measure for
the age composition of the population. This is the old-age dependency ratio which
represents the fraction of old people (65years and older) to people ofworking age (ages
between 20 and 64).Whereas this ratio ranged between 10 and 14% formost countries
in the early 1950s, at the start of the twenty-first century it lies between 20.5 and
32.5%.
The objective of this paper is to study the macroeconomic general equilibrium
effects of the demographic shocks mentioned above. Since these shocks affect the
richest countries in the world in a more or less similar fashion we adopt a closed
economy perspective, i.e. factor price changes form an important mechanism bywhich
ageing affects the macroeconomic outcome. To keep the analysis tractable we restrict
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Table 1 Demographic indicators for large OECD countries. Source: United Nations (2011)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005
United States 2.4 2.2 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.1
68.6 70.2 71.5 74.5 75.6 77.2 78.0
14.3 17.5 18.7 19.8 21.3 21.0 20.5
Japan 2.4 1.7 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
62.2 69.0 73.1 77.0 79.5 81.8 82.7
10.0 10.6 11.7 15.0 19.4 27.6 32.5
Germany 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
69.5 70.3 71.0 73.8 76.0 78.7 79.9
16.2 19.2 24.3 27.2 23.5 26.1 31.4
France 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
67.3 70.8 72.4 74.8 77.4 79.6 81.0
19.5 20.8 23.8 25.0 24.0 27.5 28.0
United Kingdom 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2
69.3 71.0 72.2 74.1 76.2 78.4 79.6
17.9 20.2 23.3 26.8 26.9 26.8 26.9
Italy 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9
66.3 69.6 72.1 74.8 77.4 80.2 81.4
14.3 16.4 19.4 23.7 24.5 29.4 32.0
Canada 2.8 2.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.1
69.0 71.3 73.0 75.8 77.8 79.7 80.5
14.0 14.6 15.1 16.2 18.5 20.4 20.9
Australia 2.3 2.2 2.0 5.5 1.5 1.3 1.4
69.3 70.9 71.7 75.1 77.5 80.3 81.4
14.0 15.9 15.5 17.1 19.1 20.8 21.4
Netherlands 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1
71.9 73.5 74.1 76.1 77.3 78.7 80.2
14.0 16.8 18.8 20.0 20.8 21.9 22.8
World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, Files 3, 5-1, and 5-3B. First row: crude birth rate (births
per 100 population). Second row: life expectancy at birth. Third row: old-age dependency ratio (population
of 65+ as a fraction of population 20–64). Rows 1–2 are averages over the 5-year interval starting in year
as indicated. Row 3 is the observation in the indicated year
attention to the long-run effects of the demographic changes only—the transitional
dynamics associated with these shocks are not considered here.1
We formulate an overlapping generations model populated by finitely-lived, utility-
maximizing individuals who are blessed with perfect foresight. At each moment in
time, disconnected generations are born. We abstract from mortality risk and use a
generalized version of the classic “certain death” model of Cass and Yaari (1967).
1 In Heijdra et al. (2014a) we build a stochastic version of the model featuring uninsured idiosyncratic risk.
We use this model to study the transitional and long-run effects of changes in the system of study loans.
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We extend their model inter alia by assuming that individual agents accumulate both
physical and human capital.
Whereas biological longevity is represented in our model by the length of time that
an agent is alive, we view economic longevity as the life spell during which the agent
is economically productive. In particular it is an aspect of the endogenous life-cycle
pattern of the stock of embodied human capital that an individual can rent out to
producers in the labour market. We operationalize the concept of economic longevity
as follows. In the tradition of the recent macroeconomic literature on human capital
accumulation we assume that individuals engage in full-time educational activities at
the start of economic life and choose the optimal age of labour market entry (Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. 2000; Boucekkine et al. 2002; Heijdra and Romp 2009). Incorporating the
insights of the empirical labour economics literature onMincerian wage equations, we
assume that participating in the labour market boosts a worker’s human capital stock
and wage income as valuable experience is gained (cf. Imai and Keane 2004). As a
worker gets older, economic ageing sets in because human capital starts to depreciate at
an increasing rate—the ageing phenomenon aptly verbalized by Burns in the opening
quote above.
We stress from the outset that our approach is predominantly a theoretical one,
i.e. we construct a highly stylized model and focus our attention on the key mecha-
nisms at work which we visualize with the aid of a plausibly parameterized version
of the model. Put differently, in order to zoom in on the pure effects of biological and
economic ageing we deliberately leave out a number of real-life features and insti-
tutions that are typically included in simulation-based models in order to achieve a
convincing calibration. For example, wemodel an economywithout a pension system,
recognize only one ability type (all workers are college educated), and ignore (unin-
sured) longevity risk. In a related paper we focus exactly on these three real-world
features and calibrate the model for the United States (see Heijdra and Reijnders
2015).
The microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of three stylized demographic
shocks are studied. The first shock is a biological longevity boost, consisting of a
substantial increase in the length of life accompanied by a constant population growth
rate and an unchanged human capital depreciation schedule. The second shock is called
a comprehensive longevity boost. This case combines the biological longevity boost
with an increase in economic longevity which we operationalize as an outward shift
of the depreciation schedule for human capital. Finally, the third shock is a pure baby
bust scenario, in which the net birth falls but the length of biological and economic
life both remain unchanged.
Our main findings are as follows. As a result of a biological longevity boost, agents
respond to the longer lifetime by choosing slightly more schooling, retiring some-
what later, and marginally increasing the length of the work career. Almost all of the
additional years of life are consumed in the form of leisure as the retirement period
increases substantially. Matters are quite different under a comprehensive longevity
boost. In this case the stocks of physical and human capital both rise sharply, with
the latter increase dominating the former. Schooling is increased only slightly, but as
retirement takes place much later on in life the length of the work career rises dramat-
ically. Surprisingly, the optimal retirement period is decreased under this shock, i.e.
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the additional years of biological life are not spent on leisure but on working. Finally,
a baby bust shock results in a slight increase in the physical capital stock accompanied
by a decrease in the stock of human capital and a small reduction in macroeconomic
output. We also show that all these conclusions are robust to real world complications
such as capital market imperfections and indivisible labour contracts.
Our paper is intended as a contribution to the extensive literature on the macroeco-
nomics of ageing. One strand of this literature studies ageing shocks using models
in which physical capital is the only accumulable production input. For recent exam-
ples, see Heijdra and Ligthart (2006), Bloom et al. (2007), Prettner and Canning
(2014), and the references accompanying these papers. There is a large diversity of
models, depending on inter alia the endogeneity or exogeneity of the agent’s labour
market retirement decision and the inclusion or exclusion of a public pension sys-
tem. But the typical conclusion that emerges from these physical-capital-only models
is that ageing results in an increase in the capital intensity of production accompa-
nied by an increase in real wages and a drop in the real rate of return on physical
capital.
A second, more recent strand of the literature adds human capital as an additional
accumulable production factor. See, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), Heijdra
and Romp (2009), and Ludwig et al. (2012) and the references therein. One of the
key features common to all these models is the endogeneity of the agent’s schooling
decision. Again many different model varieties exist, depending on the assumptions
made regarding retirement and public pension systems. The typical conclusion result-
ing from these human-plus-physical-capital models is that a longevity shock raises
both stocks, but still increases the ratio of physical to human capital employed in
production, though by a smaller amount than is the case in models without human
capital—see, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000, p. 15) and Ludwig et al. (2012,
p. 106).
In contrast to both strands of the literature mentioned above, in our model we find
that the increase in human capital dominates the boost to physical capital under the
comprehensive longevity boost so that ageing leads to a lower wage and a higher
real interest rate. By separately distinguishing biological and economic longevity we
are thus able to demonstrate that factor prices may move in a direction opposite to
the one accepted as conventional wisdom in the existing literature. Just looking at
biological age may be highly misleading: individuals may live longer but their human
capital may not. Indeed, the clear message from this predominantly theoretical paper
is the need for empirical information regarding the age profile of productivity at older
ages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2we formulate our base
model. Section 3 uses a parameterized version of the model to compute and visualize
the microeconomic and macroeconomic effects of stylized shocks in biological and
economic longevity and the net birth rate. Section 4 investigates the robustness of
our conclusions by including capital market imperfections in the form of borrowing
constraints and labour market imperfections resulting from the indivisibility of labour.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes. A brief appendix establishes some technical
results.
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2 Model
In this section we develop a dynamic microfounded general equilibrium model of a
closed economy featuring exogenous growth. All agents in the economy are endowed
with perfect foresight. The population is made up of overlapping generations of
finitely-lived agents who make optimal decisions over the life cycle. There is no
longevity risk.2 Firms use stocks of physical and human capital in order to produce
the homogeneous good. Individuals accumulate the two types of capital by saving,
by enjoying formal education at the start of economic life, and by gaining experience
on the work floor. In the first two subsections we discuss the optimal decisions made
by firms and individuals, and in the final subsection we characterize the steady-state
macroeconomic equilibrium.
2.1 Firms
Technology features constant returns to scale, the goods market is perfectly compet-
itive, and we postulate the existence of a single representative firm facing a linear
homogeneous production function of the Cobb–Douglas form:
Y (t) = 0K (t)εk [Z(t)HC(t)]1−εk , 0 < εk < 1, 0 > 0, (1a)
where Y (t) is aggregate output, Z(t) = Zegt represents Harrod-neutral technological
progress, g is the exogenous growth rate (g ≥ 0), and K (t) and HC(t) stand for the
inputs of, respectively, physical and human capital. Aggregate profit is given by:
(t) ≡ Y (t) − w(t)HC(t) − (r(t) + δk)K (t),
where r(t) is the real interest rate, δk is the constant depreciation rate of physical
capital, and w(t) is the rental rate on standardized units of human capital. The firm
chooses its inputs K (t) and HC(t) in order to maximize profits. This gives the usual
marginal productivity conditions:














2 By postulating a rectangular mortality profile we are able to sidestep troublesome issues relating to
annuitization that are tangential to the topic of this paper. Indeed, in the presence of longevity risk, economic
theory strongly predicts that full annuitization of assets is optimal to an individual. In reality, however, people
hardly buy annuities at all—the so-called “annuity puzzle”. In the absence of annuities, uninsured agents
leave accidental bequests which—in the context of a general equilibrium model—must be redistributed
somehow. Ludwig et al., for example, assume that these bequests are transferred in equal amounts to all
surviving agents (2012, p. 97). As is shown in Heijdra et al. (2014b), however, the specific age-profile of
transfers exerts a major influence on allocation and welfare effects.
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where k(t) ≡ K (t)/ [P(t)Z(t)] , hc(t) ≡ HC(t)/P(t), and P(t) is the total popula-
tion (see below). Profits are equal to zero as a result of the linear homogeneity of the
production technology.
In the remainder of the paper we restrict attention to the balanced growth path for
which hc (t) = hc, k(t) = k, r(t) = r, w˜(t) ≡ w˜, and y(t) ≡ Y (t)/ [P(t)Z(t)] = y
are all time-invariant, and the rental rate on human capital grows exponentially at the
constant rate g, i.e. w(t) = w (v) eg(t−v).
2.2 Individuals
We follow Cass and Yaari (1967) by assuming that individuals have finite lives but





(c(v, t), z(v, t))e−ρ(t−v)dt, (2a)
where (·) is instantaneous utility (or “ felicity”), c(v, t) is consumption of a person
of vintage v at time t, z(v, t) is leisure, ρ is the pure rate of time preference, and Db
is the age at which sudden biological death occurs. The felicity function takes the
following convenient form:
(c(v, t), z(v, t)) ≡
(
c(v, t)1−εz z(v, t)εz
)1−1/σ − 1
1 − 1/σ , (2b)
with 0 < εz < 1 and 0 < σ < 1. The parameter σ represents the intertempo-
ral substitution elasticity for subfelicity which itself is a Cobb–Douglas function of
consumption and leisure, i.e. the intratemporal substitution elasticity between con-
sumption and leisure is equal to unity. Although our theoretical expressions are valid
for values of σ exceeding unity, we restrict attention in this paper to the empirically
plausible case featuring 0 < σ < 1 for which case consumption and leisure are direct
substitutes (see Lemma 1 in the “Appendix 1”).
The accumulation of financial assets, a(v, t), proceeds according to:
a˙(v, t) = ra(v, t) + w(t)l(v, t)h(v, t) − c(v, t),
where a˙(v, t) ≡ da(v, t)/dt is net asset accumulation, l(v, t) is labour supply, and
h(v, t) is the stock of human capital. In the absence of a bequest motive, individuals
are born without any financial assets (a(v, v) = 0) and will choose to expire bare of
such assets as well (a(v, v + Db) = 0). It thus follows that in the presence of perfect
capital markets the lifetime budget constraint is given by:
∫ v+Db
v
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The accumulation of human capital, h(v, t), depends critically on the use of time
over the life cycle.3 The agent’s choices of E and R constitute important life-cycle
decisions. The time line of a person’s life takes the following form.
vE v+ E v+ R v+ Db
education employment retirement
Throughout life the individual has a time endowment of one unit. At the start of
economic life, for ages 0 ≤ t − v < E , the individual does not supply any labour to
the market (l(v, t) = 0) but engages in full-time training which we take to involve
e0 units of time. Startup education and working in the market are thus modeled as
mutually exclusive activities.4 Assuming that the individual chooses schooling E and




1 − e0 for 0 ≤ t − v < E
1 − l(v, t) for E ≤ t − v < R
1 for R ≤ t − v ≤ Db
(2d)
Depending on the length of the schooling period, the agent enters the labour market
with a stock of marketable human capital equal to:
h (v, v + E) = eG(E),
where G (E) is a function such that there exist positive but diminishing returns to
education (∂h (v, v + E) /∂E > 0 and ∂2h (v, v + E) /∂E2 < 0 ). See Fig. 1a for an
illustration of the training function that we use in our quantitative analysis below.
Following labour market entry at age t −v = E , the individual starts accumulating
human according to the following schedule:
h˙(v, t) = [γ l(v, t) − δh(t − v)]h(v, t), for E ≤ t − v ≤ Db, γ > 0,
where δh(t −v) is the age-dependent depreciation rate of human capital. The accumu-
lation function combines two distinct mechanisms. First, by working in the market the
agent gains experience which we assume to be proportional to the number of hours
worked times the available stock of human capital, i.e. a smart worker gains more
experience per unit of work time than a less accomplished colleague and the higher is
labour supply the larger is the gain per unit of available human capital. The parameter
γ regulates the strength of this experience effect.5 The second mechanism captures
3 Following the seminal paper by Ben-Porath (1967), a large literature on endogenous human capital
formation has emerged. Key contributions are by Weiss (1972), Rosen (1972), Blinder and Weiss (1976),
Heckman (1976), and Driffill (1980).
4 The assumptionof a start-up educationphase of endogenous length is a standardone in themacroeconomic
literature. See, for example, de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000), Boucekkine
et al. (2002), and Heijdra and Romp (2009).
5 In early contributions to the human capital literature, Weiss (1972) and Rosen (1972) stress the impor-
tance of work experience (or learning-by-doing) effects. Subsequent contributions were made by inter alia
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Fig. 1 Features of the human capital accumulation process. a Training function, eG(E). b depreciation
rate, δh(u). For the training function we postulate G(E) = β0 + β1E − β2E2 whilst for the human capital
depreciation function we use δh(u) = δ0 + 1δ1(De−u) , where u is the agent’s age. The choice of De and
the β and δ parameters is explained in the parameterization section below
the economic ageing effect. Old age is postulated to be associated with a loss of skills
and physical abilities which we model by taking the depreciation rate to be increasing
in age (δ′h(t − v) > 0). We assume that limu→De δ′h(s) = +∞ for E < De < Db,
i.e. the depreciation function features a vertical asymptote at u = De which we call
the age of economic death.6 Figure 1b depicts the depreciation function we use in our
quantitative analysis below.
By solving the differential equation for human capital subject to the initial condition
we find:
h(v, t) = eG(E)+
∫ t
v+E [γ l(v,τ )−δh(τ−v)]dτ , (2e)
and thus:
∂h(v, t)
∂l (v, τ )
=
{
γ h(v, t) for τ < t
0 for τ ≥ t
∂h(v, t)
∂E
= [G ′ (E) − (γ l (v, v + E) − δh (E)) ]h (v, v + E)
By its very nature, humancapital is a predeterminedvariable in that it is only affected
by choices made in the past. This explains why only past labour supply decisions
influence the stock at any moment in time. Note furthermore that the proportional
effect on the human capital stock of a marginally higher level of education is captured
Footnote 5 continued
Shaw (1989) and Imai and Keane (2004). The latter postulate a constant depreciation rate and an age-
dependent learning coefficient, γ (s). Assuming that γ (s) must be non-negative, their approach features
less scope for ageing effects.
6 If economic and biological death were to coincide, then the agent’s incentives to retire are severely
weakened and withdrawal from the labour market takes place very late in life. In Heijdra and Reijnders
(2015) we study an alternative economic ageing process which does not feature a vertical asymptote.
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by the difference between the gross return to education (G ′ (E)) and the net return to
job market experience (γ l (v, v + E) − δh (E)).
The agent chooses the education level E , the retirement age R, and time profiles for
consumption {c (v, τ )}v+Dbτ=v , and labour supply {l (v, τ )}v+Dbτ=v in order to maximize
lifetime utility (2a) subject to the lifetime budget constraint (2c) and the human capital
equation (2e). The first-order condition for consumption during life is given by:
c(c(v, t), z(v, t)) = λ(v)e−(r−ρ)(t−v), for 0 ≤ t − v ≤ Db, (3a)
where λ(v) is the (optimized value of the) Lagrange multiplier for the lifetime budget
constraint (2c) representing themarginal utility of wealth. At eachmoment in time, the
agent chooses consumption such that the marginal utility cost (right-hand side of (3a))
is equated to the marginal benefit (left-hand side of (3a)) of additional consumption.
One feature of theoptimal consumptionpath canbededuced already. Since the right-
hand side of (3a) is continuous in the consumer’s age, it follows from the indivisibility
of schooling time and the perfect divisibility of labour supply that there generally
exists a discrete jump in consumption at age E satisfying:7
c (v, v + E)
c
(
v, v + E−) =
(
1 − e0




where we write f (x−) for the left limit of f at x , i.e. f (x−) ≡ limz↗x f (z). If,
for example, the optimally chosen supply of hours at labour market entry exceeds
the time requirement of schooling (l(v, v + E) > e0), then it follows from (3b) that
consumption features an upward jump at age E (c(v, v + E) > c(v, v + E−)) which
compensates for the downward jump in leisure occurring at that point in the life cycle.
The first-order condition for labour supply during the work career is given by:
z(c(v, t), z(v, t)) =
[
w(t)h(v, t) + γ V (v, t)] λ(v)e−(r−ρ)(t−v),
for E ≤ t − v < R, (3c)
where V (v, t) is the present value of future wage income:
V (v, t) ≡
∫ v+R
t
w(τ)l(v, τ )h(v, τ )e−r(τ−t)dτ. (3d)
Again the optimal decision rule equates marginal costs and benefits of increasing
leisure consumption. By working a little less the agent obtains more leisure, the mar-
ginal benefits of which are given by the left-hand side of (3c). The marginal cost of
leisure is given by the right-hand side of (3c) and consists of forgone direct wage
income w(t)h(v, t) (backward-looking) plus the imputed value of forgone human
capital γ V (v, t) (forward-looking), all expressed in utility terms.
7 Heckman (1974) was the first to stress the importance of non-separable preferences in a life-cycle model
with endogenous consumption and labour supply choices.
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The first-order condition for the years of schooling (and age of labour market entry)
is given by:
(c(v, v + E−), 1 − e0) − (c(v, v + E), 1 − l(v, v + E))
= λ(v)e−(r−ρ)E
[













This optimality condition equalizes the marginal gains and losses from additional
schooling. The left-hand side represents the change in felicity that occurs the moment
the agent leaves school and enters the labour market. The right-hand side states the
three components that make up the marginal utility cost of increasing E . The first
term in square brackets shows that the agent foregoes wage earnings by staying in
school a bit longer. The second term is a negative cost, namely the net return to
education relative to gaining experience on the job. The third term gives the effect of
the consumption jump at age E .
Finally, the first-order condition for the optimal retirement age is given by:
(c(v, v + R−), 1 − l(v, v + R−)) − (c(v, v + R), 1 − l(v, v + R))
= λ(v)e−(r−ρ)R
[
− w(v + R−)l(v, v + R−)l(v, v + R−)
+
(
c(v, v + R−) − c(v, v + R)
)]
. (3f)
The left-hand side gives the change in felicity experienced at labour market exit. The
right-hand represents the utility cost of retiring slightly later on in life. The first term
in square brackets is a negative cost consisting of the wage income that is earned by
staying in the work force somewhat longer. The second term accounts for a possible
consumption jump at age R. It follows from (3a) that:
c (v, v + R)
c
(
v, v + R−) =
(
1 − l (v, v + R−)




Because labour is perfectly divisible and labour supply is zero at retirement
(l (v, v + R) = 0), it follows that the consumption path is continuous at age R and
that l(v, v + R−) = 0, i.e. there is no jump in labour supply at retirement either.
We summarize the key microeconomic relationships in panel (a) of Table 2. The
micro model is written entirely in the agent’s age u ≡ t − v. Scaled variables are
defined as:
c˜ (u) ≡ c(v, v + u)
Z (v)
, V˜ (u) ≡ V (v, v + u)
Z(v)
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Table 2 Model equations
(a) Microeconomic relationships
c˜ (u) = μz (u)σ∗εz (1−1/σ) eσ∗(r−ρ)u , 0 ≤ u ≤ Db (T1.1)
l(u) = 1 − εz
1 − εz
c˜(u)




1 − e0 for 0 ≤ u < E
1 − l(u) for E ≤ u < R




E [γ l(s)−δh (s)]ds , E ≤ u < De (T1.4)
V˜ (u) = w˜ egu
∫ R
u
l(s)h(s)e−(r−g)(s−u)ds, E ≤ u < R (T1.5)
e−r E V˜ (E) =
∫ Db
0
c˜ (u) e−rudu (T1.6)



















l (u) h (u) e−nudu (T1.9)
c = (r − g − n)k + w˜ hc (T1.10)












(c) Demographic steady state
1 = b(n, B) (T1.13)
The properties of (n, Db) and (n, B) are covered in Lemma 3. Redefined variables: c˜(u) ≡
c(v, t)/Z(v), V˜ (u) ≡ V (v, t)/Z(v), z(u) ≡ z(v, v + u), l(u) ≡ l(v, v + u), h(u) ≡ h(v, v + u), and
μ ≡ Z(v)−1((1 − εz)/λ(v))σ∗ . Auxiliary parameter: σ∗ ≡ σ1−εz (1−σ)
and with a slight abuse of notation we write:
l (u) ≡ l(v, v + u), h (u) ≡ h(v, v + u), z (u) ≡ c(v, v + u).
By virtue of the structure of the felicity function, the microeconomic relationships
provide time-invariant solutions for the life-cycle dates E and R, and age-dependent
solutions for scaled consumption, c˜ (u), the scaled value of the stock of human capital,
V˜ (u), labour supply, l (u), and the stock of human capital, h (u).
Equation (T1.1) expresses the optimal path for consumption over the life cycle con-
ditional on a time-invariant term involving the transformed marginal utility of wealth
(μ), the amount of leisure consumption (z(u) ), and an exponential term (eσ
∗(r−ρ)u).
It is obtained by using (2b) and (3a). Equation (T1.2) gives the expression for optimal
labour supply over the life cycle. It is obtained by combining (3a) and (3c), using (2b),
and noting that w(t) = w(v)eg(t−v) and w (t) = w˜Z(t). Equations (T1.3)–(T1.6) are
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rewritten versions of, respectively, (2d), (2e), (3d), and (2c). Finally, equation (T1.7)
gives the implicit function determining the optimal amount of schooling. It is obtained
by substituting (3a)–(3b) and the expression for ∂h(v, t)/∂E in (3e) and rewriting.
2.3 Demography and Macroeconomic Equilibrium
We allow for a positive growth rate of the population, which we denote by n , and
assume that the economy is in a demographic steady state. Agents are fertile for ages
0 ≤ u < B < Db and the net birth rate b is age-independent. The population level at
time t is P(t) = P(v)en(t−v) and the size of the new cohort born at time v is given
by P (v, v) = b ∫ vv−B P (s, v) ds. Since P(s, v) = P(v, v) for 0 ≤ v − s ≤ Db and
P(t) ≡ ∫ tt−Db P (v, v) dv it follows that:
1 = b(n, B) , (4a)
where(·) is a “ demographic” function implied by the postulated birth and mortality
processes.8 In general form this function is given by:







T for n = 0
(4b)
where T is a positive parameter. We show in Lemma 3 in the “Appendix 2” that
(n, T ) is strictly positive, decreasing in n, and increasing in T .
Equation (4a) is the demographic equilibrium condition providing an implicit rela-
tionship between the net birth rate b, the growth rate of the population n, and the
maximum age of fertility B. Once two of these parameters have been set, the third
is implied by (4a). In Fig. 2, the solid line depicts (n, B). By selecting a particular
value for the net birth rate, say b = b0, the equilibrium population growth rate n0 is
obtained. For future reference we restate the demographic steady-state condition in
(T1.13) in Table 2.
The age composition of the population is derived as follows. Absolute cohort sizes
satisfy P(v, t) = P (v, v) for v ≤ t ≤ v + Db and P(v, t) = 0 for t > v + Db and
P(t, t) = P(v, v)en(t−v) we easily find that relative cohort sizes in the age domain
are given by:





for 0 ≤ u ≤ Db
0 for u > Db
(4c)
where b¯ ≡ P(t, t)/P(t) = 1/(n, Db) represents the crude birth rate. In Fig. 2 the
equilibrium crude birth rate associated with the net rate b0 is given by b¯0. The relative
size of a cohort falls with its age not because of ongoing mortality but rather because
the population as a whole is growing over time.
8 As we model a closed economy, immigration and emigration flows are absent by definition.
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Fig. 2 Demographic
equilibrium. The solid line
depicts (b, n) combinations for
which the demographic
equilibrium condition is satisfied
(holding constant B). For a given
net birth rate, b0, the equilibrium
growth rate of population growth
is n0, i.e. 1/b0 = (n0, B). The
dashed line plots the inverse of
the crude birth rate as a function






Armed with the relative cohort weights (4c) it is possible to derive the key macro-
economic relationships—see equations (T1.8)–(T1.12) in Table 2. Equation (T1.8)
is obtained as follows. First, note that total consumption is defined as C(t) ≡
P(t)
∫ t
t−Db c(v, t)p(v, t)dv, where we have used the fact that P(v, t) ≡ P(t)p(v, t).
By exploiting the stationarity property of scaled consumption, c˜(t−v), and substituting









where c(t) denotes consumption in terms of raw efficiency units. Since the right-
hand side of (4d) is independent of the generations index v, it follows that c(t) is
time-invariant, as is indicated in (T1.8).
Equation (T1.9) is obtained by noting that HC(t) ≡ P(t) ∫ t−Et−R l(v, t)h(v, t)
p(v, t)dv and recalling that l(v, t), h(v, t), and p(v, t) depend only on age. Finally,
equation (T1.10) follows in a straightforward fashion from the aggregate asset accu-
mulation equation,
A˙(t) = r A(t) + w(t)HC(t) − C(t), (4e)
in combination with the capital market equilibrium condition A(t) = K (t), where
A(t) ≡ P(t) ∫ tt−Db a(v, t)p(v, t)dv, and the steady-state condition k˙(t)/k(t) =
K˙ (t)/K (t) − (g + n) = 0.
The model features a two-way interaction between the microeconomic and
macroeconomic parts. For given values of the macroeconomic equilibrium fac-
tor prices (w˜ and r ), the microeconomic part determines optimal values for
c˜(u), V˜ (u), l(u), h(u), E , and R. Using these micro variables in the macroeconomic
part gives general equilibrium solutions for c, hc, k, w˜, and r . The functional form of
the felicity function (2b) satisfies the King–Plosser–Rebelo conditions ensuring that
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income and substitution effects on labour supply of changes in w˜ exactly cancel out
(King et al. 2002). In the context of the model studied here, it thus follows that (a) the
optimal choices for E, R, l(u), and h(u) are independent of the rental rate on human
capital, w˜, and (b) that optimal choices for c˜(u) and V˜ (u) are homogeneous of degree
one in w˜.
2.4 Model Solution and Parameterization
As we cannot obtain an analytical solution to the system of equations given in Table 2
we have to solve it numerically. The main difficulty lies in the fact that labour supply
at any point in time depends both on past (via human capital) and future (through
experience effects) labour supply choices. This means that we have to loop over the
age profile for labour supply in order to obtain a consistent solution. At the same time,
the non-separability of leisure and consumption in the felicity function means that
we cannot solve for labour supply choices separate from consumption allocations.
To speed up the computations we program the model in Fortran 90 and use spline
interpolation and root finding techniques.
In view of the highly stylized nature of the model we stop short of a full calibration
exercise.9 Instead we focus on a small number of stylized facts concerning labour
supply, wages, and the retirement age and choose the structural parameters to match
these. We check the quality of the parameterization by showing that empirically rea-
sonable values are obtained for key indicators such as the age-dependent labour supply
elasticities (see below).
The structural parameters of the model are given in Table 3. The model is parame-
terized in the following way. In the base model we assume that individuals live for
78years (Db = 60) and that the population grows at 1% per annum (n = 0.01). For
these values, the crude birth rate is just over 2% per annum (b¯ = 2.2164 × 10−2). If
the maximum age of fertility is set at the biological age of forty (B = 22) this value
for the crude birth rate is obtained if the net birth rate is set at b = 5.0638× 10−2. We
parameterize themodel in such away that the individual chooses 4years of schooling—
thus entering the labour market at age 22 (E = 4)—and retires at biological age 65
(R = 47). We furthermore ensure that the equilibrium interest rate is 5% per annum
(r = 0.05) and that per capita output is normalized to unity (y = 1). The deprecia-
tion rate for physical capital and the exogenous rate of economic growth are set at,
respectively, 7 and 2% per annum (δk = 0.07 and g = 0.02). For the intertemporal
substitution elasticity we use σ = 0.7, a value that is consistent with the empirical
evidence (e.g. Skinner 1985; Attanasio andWeber 1995). The pure rate of time prefer-
ence is set at ρ = 0.025, thus ensuring a strong savings motive in the population. The
individual uses half of the time endowment for studying during the schooling period
(e0 = 0.5). Interpreting the net-of-sleeping day to last for 16 hours, this means that
each student spends 8 hours per day on formal education. For future reference, we
define a full-time working day as lF = 0.5.
9 In Heijdra and Reijnders (2015) we formulate and calibrate a version of the model with the following
more realistic features: (a) indivisible labour (as in Sect. 4.2 below), (b) two imperfectly substitutable labour
types (skilled and unskilled), (c) a rudimentary pension system, and (d) a realistic mortality profile.
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Table 3 Parameter values
Targeted steady-state life-cycle dates
E 4.0000 Years of education
R 47.0000 Retirement age
Targeted steady-state macro outcomes
y 1.0000 Steady-state output
r 0.0500 Interest rate
Chosen parameters
De 54.0000 Maximum feasible retirement age
Db 60.0000 Age at certain death
σ 0.7000 Intertemporal substitution elasticity
ρ 0.0250 Pure rate of time preference
γ 0.0800 Return to experience
δ0 0.7654 × 10−2 Parameter of the human capital depreciation profile
δ1 1.5000 Parameter of the human capital depreciation profile
β1 0.1000 Parameter of the return-to-education function
e0 0.5000 Time spent studying during education
n 0.0100 Population growth rate
g 0.0200 Economic growth rate
δk 0.0700 Depreciation rate of physical capital
Calibrated parameters
εc 0.3198 Preference parameter for consumption
β0 −0.3046 Parameter of the return-to-education function
β2 0.5960 × 10−2 Parameter of the return-to-education function
b¯ 2.2164 × 10−2 Crude birth rate
εk 0.2351 Capital efficiency parameter
0 1.5610 Scale factor production function
The return to education is governed by a simple quadratic function:
G(E) = β0 + β1E − β2E2, β1 > 0, β2 > 0.
We choose the β-parameters to ensure that eG(E) is increasing and concave in E for a
range of plausible values. We fix β1 = 0.10 , set β2 in such a way that the first-order
condition for schooling [given in (T1.7)] is satisfied for E = 4, and choose the value
for β0 such that G(4) = 0. This approach yields the concave training function that is
illustrated in Fig. 1a.
Regarding the depreciation rate of human capital we propose:
δh(u) = δ0 + 1
δ1(De − u) for 0 ≤ u < De, δ0 > 0, δ1 > 0.
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This function has a vertical asymptote at (what we call) the age of economic death, De.
This means that the human capital stock is driven to zero at this age.10 The functional
form allows us to easily control both the level and the shape of the depreciation
profile. We choose δ0 and δ1 so that δh(u) remains nearly flat initially but increases
rapidly when approaching De. This curvature guarantees an interior solution for the
retirement age R. In particular, it will always lie to the left of De. In the base model
we set De = 54 which, in combination with a suitable choice for εz , gives rise
to a calibrated equilibrium featuring retirement at age 65 (R = 47). The resulting
depreciation function is depicted in Fig. 1b.
The hourly wage rate of a u-year old agent with education level E is given by
W (u) = w(v + u)h(u). In logarithmic form we obtain:











This expression bears a strong resemblance to a Mincer equation which typically
regresses the log of wages on a constant, education, and potential experience (both
in level and squared). Our specification is quadratic in education, consistent with the
empirical findings by Heckman et al. (2006, p. 320) rejecting linearity. The estimates
for β1 reported by Heckman et al. range for white male workers between 0.10 and 0.13
(2006, p. 326). The parameter γ is much harder to pin down from the empirical evi-
dence because potential experience, as proxied by u−E , enters the theoretical Mincer
equation in a very complicated fashion—indeed, u and E enter non-additively in our
expression. Whereas in empirical studies experience-squared is included to capture
the concavity of the age-earnings profile in the data, in our model the depreciation rate
of human capital captures that phenomenon. After some experimentation we choose
γ = 0.08, which implies that a full-timeworker enjoys wage growth due to experience
of 4% per annum (=γ lF = 0.04). The implicit rate of return to education from the
perspective of age E is given by rE ≡ r + G ′(E) − γ l(E) + δh(E) which is about
8.05% for the parameterization adopted here.11
We visualize the individual life-cycle profiles for the most important variables in
Fig. 3. To facilitate interpretation, biological age u + 18 rather than economic age
u ≡ t − v is plotted along the horizontal axes. Panel (a) depicts the calibrated life-
10 Pfeiffer and Reuss (2008, p. 633) use a special case of this function by setting δ0 = 0 and De = Db .
Hence, they do not make a distinction between economic and biological death. See also footnote 6 above.
11 Equation (T1.5) can be evaluated for u = E to give:




We interpret V˜ (E) as the underlying “ asset” and derive its implicit rate of return by noting that it satisfies
the following arbitrage equation:
rE =




where the path for l(u) and the retirement age R are held constant in the perturbation of V˜ (E).
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Fig. 3 Life-cycle profiles. a Labour supply, l(u). b Scaled consumption, c˜(u). c Human capital, h(u).
d scaled financial assets, a˜(u). e Opportunity cost of leisure shares. f Wage income, w˜egul(u)h(u)
cycle profile of labour supply. Labour market entry occurs at age 22 whilst retirement
takes place at age 65. Labour supply is fairly constant for much of the work period
but after age 60 the agent quickly reduces working hours and retires.
Panel (b) depicts the life-cycle path for scaled consumption. During the schooling
and retirement periods leisure is constant and it follows from (T1.1) that consumption
grows at an exponential rate σ ∗(r − ρ) which is about 2.2% per annum in the para-
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meterization (see Table 2). During the employment period the time change in leisure
augments the growth rate of consumption somewhat. Consistent with (3b) there is a
(small) upward jump in consumption at labour market entry.
Panel (c) illustrates the optimal life-cycle path of human capital. The parameteri-
zation procedure ensures that the stock of human capital at labour market entry equals
unity. During much of working life experience effects are strong and depreciation is
low, resulting in a sharply increasing profile for human capital. The peak is reached
around the age of 53 after which economic ageing in the form of increasing deprecia-
tion starts to dominate resulting in the depletion of the stock at the calibrated age of 72.
Of course, as panel (a) shows, the agent has long since left the labour force at that age.
Panel (d) depicts the other stock that an individual accumulates over the life cycle,
namely financial assets. Note that the asset path supporting (and originating from) an
individual’s optimal choices can be written as follows:






w˜egsl(s)h(s) − c˜(s)] er(u−s)ds.
As the diagram shows, assets are zero at the beginning and end of life and the agent is
a net debtor until about age 40. Assets peak just before withdrawing from the labour
market and are gradually decumulated during the retirement phase.
Panel (e) depicts the changing role of explicit and implicit remuneration of labour
over the life cycle—a phenomenon first noted by Imai and Keane (2004, p. 602). A
young individual is willing to work for relatively low wages because a large part of
the work remuneration accrues in the form of experience effects. The opposite holds
for an old individual, who has little use for building up experience due to the brief
remaining lifetime and instead is affected principally by wages in the labour supply
decision. In order to get a quantitative “ feel” for the importance of the age effect in
labour supply we follow Keane and Rogerson (2012, pp. 469–471) by computing the
income-compensated age-dependent labour supply elasticities implied by our parame-
terization. The resulting elasticities are visualized in Fig. 4. The solid line represents
Fig. 4 Labour supply
elasticities. The solid line depicts
the temporary labour supply
elasticity, i.e. the percentage rate
of decline in labour supply of a
u-year old worker resulting from
a 1% increase in the labour
income tax that lasts for one
year. The dashed line depicts the
labour supply elasticity for a
permanent tax increase. In both
cases the tax revenue is rebated
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the percentage rate of decline in labour supply of a u-year old worker resulting from
a 1-year increase in the labour income tax, the revenue of which is rebated to the
agent in the form of a lump-sum transfer. Whereas this transitory labour elasticity is
quite low for young workers, it is strongly increasing in age and is rather large for old
workers. A similar pattern is observed for the compensated elasticity with respect to
a permanent tax increase (the dashed line). Interestingly, the results from our model
are very similar to the ones reported by Keane and Rogerson (2012, p. 471) which
themselves are based on the estimated model by Imai and Keane (2004).
Key features of the general equilibrium attained in the base model (BM hereafter)
are presented in column (a) of Table 4. The consumption-output ratio is 79.1%, and
the capital-output ratio is 1.960. Both are quite plausible values.
3 Demographic Shocks
In this section we study the quantitative effects of stylized demographic ageing shocks
on microeconomic behaviour and macroeconomic outcomes. We restrict attention to
three types of demographic shocks. The first shock is a biological longevity boost
(BLB hereafter), consisting of a substantial increase in the length of life accompanied
by a constant population growth rate and an unchanged human capital depreciation
schedule. The second shock combines economic and biological ageing and is called a
comprehensive longevity boost (CLB hereafter). This case combines the BLB with an
increase in economic longevity whichwemodel as an outward shift of the depreciation
schedule for human capital. Finally, the third shock is a pure baby bust (BB hereafter)
scenario, in which the net birth falls but the length of biological and economic life
both remain unchanged.
3.1 Biological Longevity Boost
A biological longevity boost (BLB) consists of an exogenous increase in Db. Holding
constant the fertility parameters (b and B) and thus the population growth rate n, it
follows from Proposition 1(i) that the crude birth rate b¯ falls and the old-age depen-
dency ratio of the population increases. The latter variable is a simple indicator for the




p(v, v + u)du∫ uold
0 p(v, v + u)du
,
where somebody above biological age 65 is considered to be old (uold = 47). In
the base model we find that dr = 0.2032. In Fig. 5a the longevity boost rotates the
(n, Db) line in a clockwise fashion and the implied crude birth rate falls. Figure 5c
illustrates how the longevity shock affects the composition of the population. In that
figure, the thick solid line represents the base case scenario (BM). The dashed line
shows how the population half-pyramid changes as a result of a 7.8 year increase in the
length of life from Db = 60 to Db = 67.8. The population ages because mass of the
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Fig. 5 Demographic shocks. A Longevity boost: a demographic equilibrium, c relative cohort size. B Baby
bust: b demographic equilibrium, d relative cohort size
distribution is shifted from the young to the old. In the new demographic equilibrium
b¯ = 2.0310 × 10−2 and dr = 0.3130.
Blessed with a longer lifetime, individuals will make different choices than in the
base case scenario, even if we hold factor prices constant at their pre-shock levels. In
column (b) of Table 4 we present the partial equilibrium effects of the longevity boost.
Schooling and the retirement age increase by, respectively, 0.12 and 0.60years, whilst
the working career (R−E) is extended by almost half of 1year. In view of the fact
that life is extended by 7.8years, these effects are modest indeed. Much of the extra
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years of life will be enjoyed in the form of leisure, i.e. the retirement period (Db − R)
increases by more than 7years.
But this is not the end of the story because the adjustments of individual plans
result in significant changes in factor supplies and thus in equilibrium factor prices.
The general equilibrium effects of the longevity boost are reported in column (c) of
Table 4 . The stocks of physical and human capital increase by, respectively, 7.85
and 3.35% resulting in an increase in output of 4.39%, a 39 basis point drop in the
interest rate, and a 1.01% increase in the rental rate on human capital. The general
equilibrium effects on E, R, and R−E are in the same direction but significantly
larger than their partial equilibrium counterparts. For future reference we summarize
the general equilibrium effects on the key variables in column (a) of Table 5.
The intuition behind the effects on factor prices is as follows. Even though the length
of an individual’s biological life increases dramatically, the duration of economic life
is unaffected because the human capital depreciation schedule is held constant by
assumption under the BLB scenario. Agents have very little incentive to enjoy more
schooling and to retire later (compared to theBM) because economic ageing still sets in
at exactly the same phase of life. As a result, the stock of human capital increases only
slightly. The increased length of biological life, however, necessitates higher savings
resulting in a substantial increase in the stock of physical capital. Human capital thus
becomes relatively scarce under the BLB leading to an increase in its rental rate and
an decrease in the rate of interest.
3.2 Comprehensive Longevity Boost
A comprehensive longevity boost (CLB) features exogenous increases in both Db and
De, i.e. the biological and economic lifespan are both increased under this shock.
The biological shock is parameterized in the same way as before; Db increases from
Db = 60 to Db = 67.8, and the population ages as is illustrated by the dashed line
in Fig. 5c. The increase in economic longevity consists of an increase in the age of
economic death from De = 54 to De = 61.8. In terms of Fig. 1b the human capital
depreciation function shifts to the right.
In column (d) of Table 4 we present the partial equilibrium effects of the CLB.
Schooling and the retirement age increase by, respectively, 0.43 and 8.41years, the
working career (R−E) is extended by almost 8years, and the retirement period
(Db−R) is reduced by more than half of 1year.
The general equilibrium effects of the CLB are reported in column (e) of Table 4
and summarized in column (d) of Table 5. The stocks of physical and human capital
increase by, respectively, 12.63 and 16.95% resulting in an increase in output of
15.92%, a 35 basis point increase in the interest rate, and a 0.88% decrease in the
rental rate on human capital. Interestingly, the general equilibrium effects on E, R, and
R−E are in the same direction but significantly smaller than their partial equilibrium
counterparts. In contrast, the change in the retirement period is in the opposite direction.
The intuition behind the effects on factor prices is as follows. Both biological and
economic life spans are increased. The former gives rise to increased saving and a boost
to the stock of physical capital. The latter stimulates the accumulation of human capital
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and slows down its rate of depreciation during the active period. Since the working
career increases, the economy-wide stock of human capital increases substantially.
Human capital thus becomes relatively abundant under the CLB leading to a decrease
in its rental rate and an increase in the rate of interest.
As the comparison between columns (c) and (e) of Table 4 reveals, factor price
changes under the CLB are in the opposite direction to those resulting from the BLB.
This result confirms the findings of Heijdra and Reijnders (2015) who study longevity
shocks in a more thoroughly calibrated model with age-dependent human capital
depreciation.Whether real life changes in longevity are closer to BLB or CLB remains
an open question in the absence of convincing data on changes in labour productivity
at older ages.
3.3 Baby Bust
A baby bust (BB) consists of a decrease in the net birth rate b. For a given age of
death Db, it follows from Proposition 1 (ii) that the population growth rate n and
crude birth rate b¯ both decline whilst the dependency ratio of the population increases.
Figure 5b illustrates how the demographic equilibrium changes as a result of a drop
in the net birth rate. In Fig. 5d the dashed line illustrates how the composition of the
population changes compared to the base case scenario if the net birth rate decreases
from b = 5.0638×10−2 to b = 4.6505×10−2 (where the numbers have been chosen
to produce a 20% drop in the crude birth rate). Again, as in the previous ageing shock,
mass of the distribution is shifted from young to old agents. In the new demographic
equilibrium n = 0.2085 × 10−2, b¯ = 1.7731 × 10−2, and dr = 0.2597.
There is no direct effect on individual behavior: Db is unchanged and b and n do
not affect individual plans as is clear from equations (T1.1)–(T1.7) in Table 2. There
are nevertheless general equilibrium effects because the baby bust results in a decrease
in the population growth rate which features prominently in the macroeconomic part
of the model consisting of equations (T1.8)–(T1.12) in Table 2. Key indicators of the
equilibrium attained after the baby bust are reported in column (f) of Table 4 and in
column (g) of Table 5. In contrast to the longevity boost, the baby bust produces only
relatively small effects on most variables. Schooling and the retirement age increase
by, respectively, 0.11 and 0.58years, and the working career (R−E) is extended by
about half of 1year. The stock of physical capital increases by 0.29%whilst the human
capital stock and output fall by, respectively, 1.35 and 0.97%.
4 Robustness Checks
In the previous section we have shown that of the prototypical ageing shocks that have
hit modern economies in recent times, the longevity boosts exert quantitatively major
effects on factors supplies and on output, whereas the effects of a baby bust are very
modest. In this section we examine the robustness of these conclusions by relaxing a
number of the key assumptions underlying the base model. First, in Sect. 4.1 we drop
the assumption of perfect capital markets and postulate that individuals face binding
borrowing constraints after leaving school. Second, in Sect. 4.2 we introduce indivisi-
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bility of labour into the base model and show how life-cycle plans andmacroeconomic
outcomes are affected both qualitatively and quantitatively.
4.1 Borrowing Constraints
As is clear from the scaled asset profile in Fig. 3d, an optimizing individual is indebted
for more than 20years during the first part of his/her life. In the base model capital
markets are perfect and individuals are freely able to borrow against future wage
income. In this subsection we investigate the qualitative and quantitative importance
of this capital market assumption. 12 In the trivial case, without any borrowing allowed
whatsoever, the constraint is bound to have major effects because a positive amount
of schooling would be prohibitively unattractive as the agent has no income during
the schooling period and consumption is essential.13
We study a less drastic capital market imperfection by assuming that there exists
a perfect system of study loans during the schooling period and a prohibition on
borrowing after leaving school.14 Two regimes can be distinguished, depending on
whether or not the borrowing constraint is binding. If the constraint does not bind,
then the optimal paths for consumption and leisure are limited only by a present-value
constraint just as in the base model. We refer to this as the (Irving) Fisher Regime,
after its principal architect. In contrast, if the borrowing constraint is binding, then the
paths for consumption and leisure are limited by the availability of non-asset income,
i.e. a flow constraint is relevant in that case. We call this the (John Maynard) Keynes
Regime.15
In our extended model the life-cycles dates are as follows. The educational phase is
Fisherian and lasts for ages 0 ≤ u < E . It is followed by the Keynesian employment
phase for E ≤ u < F , where F stands for the age at which the constraint on borrowing
first ceases to bind. The remainder of life is Fisherian and consists of an employment
phase (F ≤ u < R) and a retirement phase (R ≤ u ≤ Db).
12 An earlier macroeconomic literature investigates the effects of borrowing constraints on the economic
growth rate. See, for example, Jappelli and Pagano (1994, 1999) and De Gregorio (1996).
13 Solving the base model under the life-time borrowing constraint yields: E = 0 , R = 48.875,(v0) =
−12.715, y = 0.839, k = 1.854, hc = 0.367 , w˜ = 1.747, and 100 × r = 3.637. Compared to the base
model, physical and human capital stocks fall by, respectively, 5.37 and 19.17%, whilst output drops by
16.12%. Wages rise because human capital get scarcer. The borrowing constraint ceases to be binding at
biological age 32.382, i.e. agents are constrained throughout their youth.
14 We call this a perfect system because students can borrow as much as they like at the going market rate
of interest, restrained only by the requirement that they redeem their study debt upon leaving school. In
the absence of borrowing constraints after leaving school the study loan system is completely neutral—see
below. For a more extensive quantitative analysis of different study loans systems in a stochastic setting,
see Heijdra et al. (2014a).
15 Weiss (1972) uses the terminology Jevons phase and Ramsey phase for, respectively, our Keynesian and
Fisherian Regimes. In our view the notion of consumption being constrained by the flow of income is most
closely associated with Keynes. Furthermore, the dynamic approach to individual saving was pioneered by
Fisher.
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vE v+ E v+ F v+ R v+ Db
education employment retirement
“Fisher” “Keynes” “Fisher”
The study loans systemworks as follows. During the schooling period (0 ≤ t−v <
E) the agent can borrow freely at the given interest rate r and thus accumulates study
debt according to:
s˙(v, t) = rs(v, t) + c(v, t),
where s(v, v) = 0 as the students enters the systemwith a clean slate.Upon completion
of the educational period the agent is facedwith a study debt of s(v, v+E)whichmust
be paid off over the remaining lifetime. Hence, for E ≤ t − v < Db the accumulation
identity for study loans is given by:
s˙(v, t) = rs(v, t) − i(v), such that s(v, v + Db) = 0,
where i(v) is the periodic redemption payment which we assume for simplicity sake
to be age-independent. In present value terms the system of study loans imposes the






In the Fisherian regime (F ≤ t −v ≤ Db) regular financial assets evolve according
to:
a˙(v, t) = ra(v, t) + w(t)l(v, t)h(v, t) − c(v, t) − i(v),
with a(v, v + F) = a(v, v + Db) = 0 so that the present-value constraint is given by:
∫ v+R
v+F
w(t)l(v, t)h(v, t)e−r(t−v)dt =
∫ v+Db
v+F
[c(v, t) + i(v)]e−r(t−v)dt. (5b)
Equation (5b) replaces (2c) and differs from it because (i) F > E > 0 and (ii)
redemption payments feature on the right-hand side.16
The agent chooses E, F, R, i(v), {c (v, τ )}v+Dbτ=v , and {l (v, τ )}v+Dbτ=v in order tomax-
imize lifetime utility (2a) subject to the present-value budget constraints (5a) and (5b),
and the human capital equation (2e ). The optimal choices for consumption are given
by:
c(c(v, t), z(v, t)) = ξ(v) re
r E
1 − e−r(Db−E) e
−(r−ρ)(t−v) 0 ≤ t − v < E, (5c)
c(v, t) = w(t)l(v, t)h(v, t) − i(v) E ≤ t − v < F, (5d)
c(c(v, t), z(v, t)) = λ(v)e−(r−ρ)(t−v) F ≤ t − v ≤ Db, (5e)
16 If there were no constraint on the sign of regular assets then the study loan system would be completely
neutral. Indeed, in such a case the integrals in (5b) would run from E instead of F . In combination with
(5a) the resulting expression would yield (2c).
123
Human Capital Accumulation and the Macroeconomy 323
where ξ(v) and λ(v) are the Lagrange multipliers for, respectively, (5a) and (5b).
Consumption grows at the exponential rate σ ∗(r − ρ) in the two Fisherian regimes,
just as in the base model, but during the Keynesian employment regime wage income
net of redemption payments dictates the path of consumption.
The first-order condition for the redemption payment furnishes the following rela-









where  (v, τ) is a “distortion” term originating from the borrowing constraint:
 (v, τ) ≡ c(c(v, τ ), z(v, τ )) − λ(v)e
−(r−ρ)(τ−v)
λ(v)e−(r−ρ)(τ−v)
, E ≤ t − v ≤ Db. (5g)
Clearly, in view of (5d)–(5e),  (v, τ) > 0 for E ≤ t − v < F and  (v, τ) = 0 for
F ≤ t − v ≤ Db. Intuitively, the agent would like to consume more in the Keyne-
sian employment regime but the borrowing constraint prohibits this from happening.
In contrast, in the Fisherian employment and retirement regimes the agent faces no
borrowing constraint and there is thus no distortion in the consumption choice.
The first-order condition for labour supply can be written as follows:
z(c(v, t), z(v, t)) = λ(v)e−(r−ρ)(t−v)
[




 (v, τ)w (τ) l(v, τ )h(v, τ )e−r(τ−t)dτ
+ (v, t)w(t)h(v, t)
]
, E ≤ t − v ≤ R. (5h)
The first line coincides with the expression obtained for the base model (see equation
(3b) above), whilst the second and third line show the effects of the borrowing con-
straint on labour supply in the Keynesian regime. In this regime the agent partially
relaxes the consumption-reducing effect of the borrowing constraint by supplying
more hours of labour than he/she would in the absence of this restriction.
The first-order condition for the education decision is given by:
(c(v, v + E−), 1 − e0) − (c(v, v + E), 1 − l(v, v + E))
= λ(v)e−(r−ρ)E
[
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Compared to the corresponding condition in the base model ((3e)), the expression in
(5i) is much more complicated because the distortion term (v, τ) affects all three
components constituting the marginal utility cost of schooling.
Finally, the first-order conditions for F and R just impose there to be no disconti-
nuities in consumption and labour supply at these points in the life cycle.
The quantitative effects of borrowing constraints can be gleaned from columns (g)–
(h) in Table 4.17 For ease of comparison, column (a) restates the calibrated basemodel.
Comparing columns (a) and (g) we find the partial equilibrium effects of the capital
market imperfection. Optimal schooling is virtually unaffected and retirement occurs
at a slightly earlier age. Even though the agent faces a binding borrowing constraint
and is forced to underconsume for almost 4.5years, life-time utility is reduced only
by a tiny amount.
Not surprisingly, in view of the minute partial equilibrium effects, factor price
changes are rather modest and the partial and general equilibrium effects of the capital
market imperfection are very similar. Comparing columns (a) and (h) we find that
output and the stock of physical capital increase by, respectively, 0.13% and 0.65%,
whereas the stock of human capital falls by 0.03%. Life-time utility rises slightly
because the increase in the ratio between physical and human capital leads to a reduc-
tion in the interest rate thus bringing the economy closer to the Golden Rule point
(featuring r = n).
From a quantitative perspective the conclusion seems warranted that the system
of study loans postulated here virtually eliminates the unpleasant aspects of the
constraints on borrowing. It removes the teeth from the dragon of capital market
imperfections. By insulating young agents from this form of market imperfection,
the process of human capital formation is saved from otherwise inevitable destruc-
tion. The borrowing constraints that hinder agents during the employment period are
quantitatively unimportant.
Figure 6 visualizes some of the life-cycle profiles in the presence of borrowing
constraints. Panel (a) shows that the agent supplies more hours of labour between
ages E and F . Intuitively, in doing so he/she builds up human capital more rapidly
(see panel (c)) and partially alleviates the constraint on consumption. Panel (b) shows
that there is a downward jump in consumption jump at age E , for reasons explained
above, and that there exists a smooth connection between the Keynesian and Fisherian
consumption paths at age F . Finally, panel (d) depicts the profiles for scaled regular
assets and study debt. An agent’s net financial assets become positive a little before
reaching biological age 40.
The quantitative effects of demographic shocks under borrowing constrains are
summarized Table 5. Columns (b), (e), and (h) summarize the general equilibrium
solutions for, respectively, BLB, CLB, and BB. Interestingly, as the comparison with
columns (a), (d), and (g) (the base model results) reveals, the effects of demographic
shocks are quantitatively very similar with and without borrowing constraints. Indeed,
even in the absence of study loans, with agents facing life-time borrowing constraints,
exactly the same conclusion is obtained. Economies with and without borrowing con-
17 In that table, scaled redemption payments are given by ı˜ ≡ i(v)/Z(v).
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Fig. 6 Life-cycle profiles in the presence of borrowing constraints. a Labour supply, l(u). b Scaled con-
sumption, c˜(u). c Human capital, h(u). d Scaled assets and study debt, a˜(u) and s˜(u)
straints react in a very similar way to the ageing shocks that we have considered in
this paper.
4.2 Indivisible Labour
In the base model labour supply is fairly constant over much of the agent’s life but
declines sharply after age 50. Labour is perfectly divisible so retirement from the labour
force takes the form of a gradual reduction in working hours. In reality, however, part-
time jobs of the right magnitude are very hard to find or even completely absent
from the economic menu. In this subsection we therefore investigate the qualitative
and quantitative importance of the assumption regarding divisibility of labour.18 In
particular we assume that an individual can either work full time (and choose l(v, t) =
lF ) or not at all (by setting l(v, t) = 0). Whilst it is—in principle—straightforward
to recognize a finer grid of employment choices (such as half-time jobs), we employ
the 2-state model because, first, it is well established in the macroeconomic literature
18 See also Mulligan (2001), Prescott et al. (2009), and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011) on this issue.
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and, second, it gives the cleanest possible representation of the notion of indivisibility
of labour supply. We reinstate the assumption of perfect capital markets.
We can already anticipate that in the current (deterministic) set-up the agent will
start working full-time directly upon finishing school and will work until a certain
age R at which he or she retires completely from the labour force. In the Indivisible
Labour (IL hereafter) model, leisure is no longer a choice variable in itself, as it is




1 − e0 for 0 ≤ t − v < E
1 − lF for E ≤ t − v < R
1 for R ≤ t − v ≤ Db
(6a)





v+E δh(τ−v)dτ for E ≤ t − v < R
h(v, v + R)e−
∫ t
v+R δh(τ−v)dτ for R ≤ t − v ≤ De
(6b)








In the presence of perfect capital markets, the individual’s time line is the same
as in the base model. The agent chooses the education level E , the retirement age R,
and a time profile for consumption {c(v, τ )}v+Dbτ=v in order to maximize lifetime utility
(2a) subject to the lifetime budget constraint (6c) and the human capital equation
(6b). Not surprisingly, since capital markets are perfect, the first-order condition for
consumption is still as given in (3a). The optimality conditions for schooling and the
retirement age are obtained by setting l(v, t) = lF for E ≤ t − v < R and l(v, t) = 0
for R ≤ t − v ≤ Db in, respectively, (3e) and (3f):
(c(v, v + E−), 1 − e0) − (c(v, v + E), 1 − lF )
= λ(v)e−(r−ρ)E
[













(c(v, v + R−), 1 − lF ) − (c(v, v + R), 1)
= λ(v)e−(r−ρ)R
[
− w(v + R−)lFh(v, v + R−) +
(




As a consequence of the indivisibility of labour, the consumption jumps (3b) and (3g)
are replaced by:
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Fig. 7 Life-cycle profiles with indivisible labour. a labour supply, l(v). b Scaled consumption, c˜(u). c
Human capital, h(u). d Scaled financial assets, a˜(u)
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Thequantitative effects of the indivisibility constraints canbegleaned fromcolumns
(i)–(j) in Table 4. We assume that lF = 0.5 represents a full-time job. For ease
of comparison, column (a) restates the calibrated base model. Comparing columns
(a) and (i) we find the partial equilibrium effects of the labour market imperfection.
Optimal schooling is reduced by a mere 0.15years but retirement takes place as much
as 4.74years earlier. Since gradual retirement is ruled out, consumption features a
sizeable downward jump at age R and life-time utility is reduced substantially.
The general equilibrium effects of the labour market imperfection on E and R are
very similar to their partial equilibriumcounterparts.Comparing columns (a) and (j)we
find that output and the stocks of physical and human capital decrease by, respectively,
6.40, 7.04 and 6.16%. Since the ratio between physical and human capital falls, there
is a slight increase in the interest rate and decrease in the scaled wage rate.
Figure 7 visualizes some of the life-cycle profiles in the presence of IL constraints.
Panel (a) shows that the agent supplies lF hours of labour between ages E and R.
Panel (b) shows that there is a substantial downward jump in consumption jump at
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age R, for reasons explained above—see (6f). The consumption path is continuous
at age E because—by assumption—students spend a full work day on education, so
that e0 = lF . Panels (c) and (d) show that the indivisibility of labour introduces sharp
kinks in the profiles for human capital and financial wealth.
The quantitative effects of demographic shocks under indivisible labour constraints
are given in Table 5. Columns (c), (f), and (i) summarize the general equilibrium
solutions for, respectively, BLB, CLB, and BB. The comparison with columns (a),
(d), and (g) reveal two main conclusions. First, the effects of the CLB and BB are
quantitatively rather similar with and without the labour market imperfection. Second,
the effects of the BLB are somewhat different under the IL constraint. Compared to
the base model retirement is later, the increase in the capital stock is much smaller,
and both human capital and output fall. The movement of factor prices is still in line
with the results obtained in the base model. We conclude that even though economies
with and without perfect divisibility of labour are quite different, they react in a very
similar way to the ageing shocks that we have studied in this paper.
5 Conclusions
We study the steady-state general equilibrium effects of a number of stylized ageing
shocks that have hit most western economies in one form or another over the last half
century. In order to do so we formulate an overlapping generations model of a closed
economy featuring endogenous factor prices.We generalize the classic ”certain death”
framework of Cass and Yaari (1967) by assuming that individual agents accumulate
both physical and human capital. In the tradition of the recent human capital literature
we assume that individuals engage in full-time educational activities at the start of
economic life and choose the optimal age of labour market entry. Incorporating the
insights of the empirical literature on Mincerian wage equations, we assume that
participating in the labour market boosts a worker’s human capital stock as valuable
experience is gained. As a worker gets older, economic ageing sets in because human
capital starts to depreciate at an increasing rate. This prompt the rational individual to
ultimately retire from the labour force.
The first ageing shock that we consider is a purely biological one taking the form
of an increase in the age of death. Holding constant the growth rate of the population
this results in a decrease in the crude birth rate and increase in the old-age dependency
ratio. In response to the longer lifetime, agents choose more schooling, retire later,
and increase the length of the work career. Almost all of the additional years of life are
consumed in the form of leisure as the retirement period increases substantially. At
the macroeconomic level the stocks of physical and human capital both rise, with the
former increase dominating the latter. Human capital becomes relatively scarce under
the biological longevity boost (BLB) prompting an increase in its rental rate and a
decrease in the interest rate. The intuition behind this result is that the human capital
depreciation schedule is kept unchanged under the BLB. So even though individuals
enjoy a longer biological life, their economic life is unaffected.
The second ageing shock is a comprehensive longevity boost (CLB) in which both
biological and economic lifetimes are lengthened. In this case the stocks of physical
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and human capital both rise sharply, with the latter increase dominating the former.
Schooling is increased only slightly, but as retirement takes place much later on in life,
the length of the work career rises dramatically. Surprisingly, the optimal retirement
period is decreased under the CLB, i.e. the additional years of biological life are not
spent on leisure but on working. Under the comprehensive longevity boost wages
fall and the real interest rises in the long run. By separately distinguishing biological
and economic longevity we are thus able to demonstrate that factor prices may move
in a direction opposite to the one accepted as conventional wisdom in the existing
literature.
The third ageing shock is a baby bust (BB) scenario in which there is an exogenous
decrease in the net birth rate. For a given length of biological life, this implies that
the growth rate of the population and the crude birth rate both decrease whilst the
old-age dependency ratio increases. Interestingly, the quantitative effects of this shock
are rather small. The slight increase in the physical capital stock is accompanied by a
small decrease in the stock of human capital leaving macroeconomic output virtually
unchanged.
Our results are based on a plausibly calibrated numerical version of our theoretical
model. To demonstrate the robustness of our conclusions to alternative modelling
assumptions we also study two extensions. The first extension introduces a capital
market imperfection. Whereas the resulting constraints on borrowing are potentially
disastrous to the educational process,we show thatmuchof the damage can be removed
by incorporating a system of study loans for young individuals. Provided such a system
exists, the effects of the ageing shocks are very similar to those for the base model.
A second extension introduces a labour market imperfection taking the form of an
indivisibility of labour supply. Under the assumption that agents can either work full
time or not at all, ageing shocks can only affect the worker’s participation, i.e. changes
take place via the extensive margin. The indivisibility constraint itself causes non-
trivial welfare losses to the agent because the desired gradual retirement process is not
feasible. Interestingly, the conclusions with respect to the ageing shocks are qualita-
tively the same and quantitatively rather similar to the ones obtained in the basemodel.
Despite being a mainly theoretical exercise, our paper yields two very clear life-
cycle policy recommendations. First, in the presence of capital market imperfections
in the form of borrowing constraints it is vitally important that some kind of study loan
system is in place to allow young individuals to invest in their human capital at the start
of life. Second, our analysis shows that indivisible labour contracts are veryunattractive
to older workers as they would much prefer to gradually retire from the labour force.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1: Properties of the Felicity Function
Lemma 1 Let the felicity function be defined as:
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(c, z) = [c
εc zεz ]1−1/σ − 1
1 − 1/σ , 0 < σ < 1, 0 < εc, εz < 1, εc + εz = 1.
Subfelicity over consumption and leisure is of theCobb–Douglas formwhile the overall
felicity function belongs to the CRRA class with a constant intertemporal substitution
elasticity σ . The following properties can be established.
(i) Felicity is non-separable in consumption and leisure in that the marginal felicity
of consumption depends on leisure and vice versa:











(ii) Consumption and leisure are direct substitutes, i.e. an increase in consumption
lowers the marginal felicity of leisure and vice versa:










(iii) The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is not affected








(iv) The intertemporal substitution elasticity for consumption is given by:
σ ∗ ≡ − c(c, z)
ccc(c, z)
= σ
1 − εz(1 − σ) ,
where σ < σ ∗ < 1.
Proof Straightforward by differentiation. unionsq
Appendix 2: Demographic Function
Lemma 2 (Properties of the exponential function) For x 
= 0 we have:
ex > 1 + x .
Proof Define f (x) ≡ ex − (1 + x). Then f ′(x) = ex − 1 is positive for all x > 0,
zero for x = 0, and negative for all x < 0. Hence, the function f (x) reaches its global
minimum of 0 at x = 0 and is strictly positive elsewhere.
Lemma 3 (Properties of the demographic function) The demographic function (4b)
has the following properties:
(i) Positive, (n, T ) > 0.
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(ii) Decreasing in n, ∂(n, T )/∂n < 0.
(iii) Increasing in T, ∂(n, T )/∂T > 0.
Proof Part (i) follows from the definition of the demographic function as 0 < T  ∞
and e−nT ≶ 1 for n ≷ 0. The first derivatives are given by:













for n = 0




e−nT for n 
= 0
1 for n = 0
Applying Lemma 2 establishes part (ii) in case n 
= 0. Part (iii) is straightforward
given the expression for T (n, T ).
Proposition 1 (Features of the demographic structure) Consider the demographic
structure as stated in Sect. 2.3. Let uold denote the age beyond which one is considered




p(v, v + u)du∫ uold
0 p(v, v + u)du
.
Then the following properties can be established.
(i) Ceteris paribus, an increase in the length of life Db:
– does not affect the population growth rate n;
– decreases the crude birth rate b¯;
– and increases the dependency ratio dr.
(ii) Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the net birth rate b:
– decreases the population growth rate n;
– decreases the crude birth rate b¯;
– and increases the dependency ratio dr.
Proof Take B as exogenously fixed and choose a value for b and Db. Then the popula-
tion growth rate n follows from the demographic steady-state condition (4a). Applying







Given n, the crude birth rate b¯ is implicitly defined as:
1 = b¯(n, Db)
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= −T (n, Db)
(n, Db)2
< 0.





































Db − (Db − uold)e−nuold − uolden(Db−uold)
}
[enuold − 1]2 < 0 for n 
= 0
− (Db − uold)Db
2uold
< 0 for n = 0
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